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  1I  Introduction 
The design of water/wastewater tariffs and the potential role for economic 
regulators to establish ‘efficient’ prices in this context continues to trouble 
policy makers in Australia.  Of particular concern is the efficacy of the present 
pricing arrangements and whether the purported ‘signals’ to customers 
adequately reflect economic parameters (see, for example, Edwards 2007, 
Dwyer 2006). However, closer scrutiny by scholars and general agreement on 
the need for robust economic regulation has failed to transform into genuine 
consensus.  Identifying the ‘most appropriate’ approach to setting prices for 
water and wastewater services is no simple task and significant discrepancies 
have emerged on several fronts.  First, the dichotomy between fixed (service 
or connection) charges and usage (volumetric) charges varies markedly 
between and within states.  Second, the methodology employed to determine 
a price for un-metered wastewater services differs between jurisdictions.  
Third, the approved mechanics for funding extensions to the water and sewer 
networks is inconsistent.  And fourth, the acceptance and implementation of 
inclining block tariffs (IBT) is far from uniform.  In light of these discrepancies 
and the apparent absence of a universally and theoretically preferred price-
setting technique, there would appear to be merit in at least understanding the 
consumers’ preferences for different pricing regimes.  And yet there is also a 
relative paucity of information of this type and bureaucrats and regulators run 
the risk of imposing their own values on the structure and level of prices in the 
absence of an objective rationale.   
 
  2This paper attempts to make some progress to addressing these deficiencies 
by considering consumers’ preferences for a particular water price regime.  In 
light of the myriad of structural considerations that underpin a pricing regime 
for a product as complex as water, the data presented here focus on only two 
components of water tariffs: Namely, the relative weight of volumetric and 
fixed charges and the impacts of ‘pseudo-volumetric’ wastewater charges.  
The paper reports the findings of a recent study that developed empirical 
models of consumers’ preferences for billing structures for urban water 
services in regional Victoria.  
 
The paper itself comprises eight main parts. Section two provides a synoptic 
overview of the current status of water and wastewater charges applied in 
different Australian jurisdictions, honing in on the two components of interest.  
Some theoretical considerations for the establishment of fixed and volumetric 
water/wastewater charges are also briefly reviewed in this section along with 
a précis of the arguments for a composite water/wastewater charge when the 
consumption of wastewater services cannot be feasibly monitored.  The fourth 
section briefly outlines the rationale for employing a choice modelling 
approach to reveal the preferences of consumers, whilst section five offers a 
summary of the choice modelling methodology as it applies to the current 
context.   The sixth section presents the results of the choice models, before 
discussing them from a policy perspective in section seven.  Finally, some 
brief concluding remarks are presented in section eight. 
  3II Approaches to Urban Water and Wastewater Pricing 
In 2004 the Council of Australian Governments (CoAG) announced that it had 
reached agreement on a new round of water reforms, known as the National 
Water Initiative (NWI).  An important ingredient of the NWI was a call for the 
implementation of “best practice water pricing” accompanied by “improved 
pricing for Metropolitan water” (NWC 2004).  Notwithstanding the nobility of 
these ambitions and their purported links to enhanced resource allocation, 
reaching consensus on these principles has proven problematic.  More 
specifically, there is an emerging and, at times, acrimonious debate about 
what constitutes sound water and wastewater pricing for urban communities 
(see, for instance, Sibly 2006; Dwyer 2006).  Arguably, this discord is also 
reflected in current practice which varies markedly throughout Australia.  In an 
effort to illustrate the extent of the problem and to make the analysis 
manageable we consider only two elements here: The use of access (fixed) 
charges versus volumetric prices, and; alternative wastewater pricing 
regimes.      
 
(i) Fixed versus volumetric water tariffs in Australia 
All Australian jurisdictions currently structure water tariffs around fixed (or 
access) charges accompanied by a volumetric (or use) component.  The 
economic rationale for this approach is dealt with shortly, but it is worth noting 
that the magnitude and relative importance of these charges varies markedly 
between cities.  In some instances these data are complicated by the use of 
  4IBT pricing regimes that also differ in their makeup and complexity
1.  An IBT 
purportedly targets ‘discretionary water use’ by increasing the unit price of 
water once a threshold limit is exceeded (WSAA 2005).  
 
Edwards (2007) surveyed the relative size of access and volumetric charges 
across several Australian cities and found that for households consuming a 
‘typical’ 250 kilolitres in 2006-07, the use component varied between 80% (in 
Sydney and Newcastle) to a low of 49% (in Perth).   Where the household 
consumed 400 kilolitres, the volumetric component of the total water bill 
exceeded 80% in Newcastle, Sydney, Melbourne and Canberra but still fell 
short of 70% of the total water charge for households in Perth.  Households 
using a modest 100 kilolitres face an access charge which can constitute as 
much as 78% of their water bill in Perth and as little as 21% in Newcastle. 
 
It is important to realise at the outset that the relative magnitude of fixed 
charges plays a critical role in determining the effectiveness of potential price 
signals that are purportedly designed to modify consumption behaviour.  Put 
simply, ‘excessive’ fixed charges blunt the incentive to curb household water 
use, since the household’s average water charge falls only slightly when they 
refrain from using water.  Accordingly, large access charges would appear to 
be at odds with the supposed targeting of profligate water use by invoking IBT 
regimes. 
 
                                                 
1 IBT are themselves the subject of considerable debate amongst economists.  For an excellent critique 
of the problems that attend this approach see Edwards 2007 and Sibly 2006. 
  5One way to enhance the ‘signalling effect’ of water prices would be to reduce 
the access charge and increase the per unit volumetric charge.  Moreover, 
this could be achieved in a revenue neutral manner from the perspective of 
the water utility, although this would likely increase revenue variability 
between years.   
 
(ii) The rationale for separate access and volumetric charges 
The justification for applying a separate access charge for household water 
consumption is that household should be forced to confront the true fixed cost 
of providing the water infrastructure associated with water service delivery.  
This will purportedly encourage households (and water utilities) to make 
optimum investment decisions that equate marginal benefits and costs in the 
long run.    This line of argument contends that a household will rationally 
consider the access charge when deciding whether to avail themselves of the 
services of the water utility.  Similarly, this reasoning leads to the conclusions 
that the returns from access charges provide the optimal incentives for water 
utilities to extend their infrastructure. 
 
In reality, neither of these arguments holds for Australian water utilities and 
their customers.  Urban households have no choice other than to connect to 
the water network if they are fortunate enough to reside in an area declared 
as a ‘water district’.  Thus, the access charge has no meaningful signalling 
role in the decisions of households (unless they live in a mobile home or 
caravan). 
 
  6Similarly, the argument that water utilities are both sending and receiving 
appropriate economic signals via access charges is fallacious.  Much of the 
existing infrastructure of a water utility is sunk and, in many instances, has 
already been recovered in one form or another.   In this context Dwyer (2006: 
11-12) notes the case of the Burdekin Dam, which was initially funded by the 
Federal taxpayer, and the Queensland Government’s subsequent decision to 
charge a rate of return on the dam infrastructure.  In this regard Walker (1993 
- cited in Dwyer 2006) observes that there are few businesses where the 
assets are gifted by the taxpayer or consumers who are then asked to make a 
payment to cover a rate of return on money that was never spent.  Moreover, 
even if the infrastructure cost has not yet been recouped, the real 
beneficiaries are the long term owners of land who enjoy access, not just the 
immediate water users.  It was this line of thinking that led public works to be 
funded by rates on land values prior to the current exuberance for ‘user pay’ 
in its present form (Dwyer 2006).  It might also be argued that the true 
opportunity cost of water infrastructure is zero.  Once in place water 
infrastructure has virtually no alternative use and is a sunk investment.  The 
extensive efforts of regulators and water utilities to strike an economically-
meaningful access charge for water is thus a ruse, shrouded in the mystique 
of accounting standards that mask the true profitability and costs of water 
utilities (Walker and Walker 2000). 
 
In practical terms fixed access charges are more about “protect[ing] the 
supplier from demand fluctuations and reduc[ing] financial risk” (Rogers et al. 
2002: 4) than they are about sending appropriate price signals to water 
  7consumers.  Thus, whilst the economic rationale for any access charges in 
this setting is weak, the likelihood of their complete abandonment is remote.  
In any case, excessive access charges are difficult to justify on economic 
grounds. 
 
The economic debate for the establishment of volumetric charges largely 
hinges on the appropriateness of Short-Run Marginal Cost (SRMC) pricing 
and Long-Run Marginal Cost (LRMC) pricing.   SRMC refers to the cost of 
meeting an additional unit increase in demand within an existing supply 
system.  Clearly, if the system has excess capacity, because consumption is 
low relative to capacity, this will manifest in a low water price.  LRMC is 
favoured by state regulators and is implicit in the NWI (Edwards 2007).  This 
approach considers the cost of augmenting supply infrastructure as capacity 
is progressively exhausted.   
 
There are two main concerns with this approach and its present 
implementation.  First, LRMC is an appropriate mechanism for setting prices 
only insomuch as the mechanisms for augmenting supply are adopted in 
order of their economic merit.  Political intervention that sets mandatory urban 
recycling targets or constrains water trade between low value agricultural 
users and urban water authorities stands to undermine the validity of LRMC 
calculations.  Second, the current approach of some regulators (eg ESC in 
Victoria) involves the use of a ‘building block’ approach to estimate the 
revenue requirements for water businesses.  Given the earlier reservations 
  8about the (shaky) foundations of access charges, it is difficult to see how a 
volumetric charge will adequately encapsulate true LRMC. 
 
In sum, the notion of an access charge paid by current water users has only 
weak economic grounding at best and, whilst volumetric charges would ideally 
encapsulate LRMC, there is no guarantee that this will occur under present 
arrangements.  The (second) best an economist could hope for is that access 
charges are minimised and a single volumetric charge at least approximated 
LRMC. 
 
(iii) Wastewater tariffs in Australia 
The water sector’s penchant for two-part tariffs (i.e. access charges 
supplemented by a volumetric usage charge) is not restricted to water 
services.  Wastewater services also attract two part tariffs in many 
jurisdictions, although the structure of wastewater tariffs is more varied than is 
the case of water.  In South Australia residential customers are charged only 
a fixed rate based on the value of their property (SA Water 2006) whilst in 
Western Australia a two-part tariff applies; the fixed component representing 
the amortised cost of providing sewage services in each town with the 
variable component being based on the Gross Rental Value (GRV) of the 
property.  The wastewater pricing regime is Western Australia is currently 
being amended to excise the GRV component (ERA 2004).  In Queensland, 
all category two water authorities are required to impose fixed wastewater 
tariffs (NRM 2005) as occurs with some utilities in New South Wales, like 
Sydney Water.  However, several water utilities in New South Wales apply a 
  9two-part tariff for wastewater (e.g. Gosford, Hunter Water), although the 
recently released Best Practice in Pricing Principles favours a move towards 
fixed tariffs for wastewater services.  Like New South Wales, wastewater tariff 
structures vary within Victoria with about half of the water utilities applying 
fixed access charges only and the others applying a combination of fixed and 
variable charges, based loosely on water usage.   
 
One of the attractions of the study area was that it comprised residents in 
Victoria who faced different charging regimes for wastewater.  More 
specifically, about half of the customers of the North East Water Authority 
currently pay a fixed wastewater charge whilst the remainder are charged a 
fixed and volumetric component for wastewater services.   
 
(iv) The economic rationale of imposing volumetric wastewater charges 
The practicality of a volumetric charge for household wastewater services is 
complicated by the fact that wastewater volumes and composition are not 
metered at the household level.  Nor is it likely to prove feasible to install 
devices of the kind needed to achieve this level of monitoring for the 
foreseeable future.  Thus, in order to apply a volumetric charge for 
wastewater services, the regulator/water utility applies an assumption about 
the volume of water which is consumed by the household that will ultimately 
require treatment as wastewater.  For instance, in that part of the study area 
where a volumetric tariff applies, half of all water that is metered entering the 
property is assumed to return as sewage and the cost of treating that volume 
of sewage is then applied to the bill.    
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Clearly, this embeds inefficiencies insomuch as the household which, by 
virtue of its desire (or necessity) to have a large garden, swimming pool or 
other outdoor water-using features, must simultaneously assume greater 
responsibilities for the treatment of urban sewerage.  In this context the 
National Competition Council (NCC 2003) observed that “charging on a 
consumption basis for wastewater services provided to households and small 
commercial customers is generally not efficient”.  In reality, this amounts to 
little more than a defacto increase in the volumetric price of water with no 
guaranteed correlation to the costs associated with sewage-generating 
activities. 
 
However, at odds with this are observations about the strength of the nexus 
between water consumption and wastewater.  For instance, Houston et al. 
(2001: 25) contend that customers “rarely if ever decide to use the sewer, or 
not use the sewer, once a decision is made to turn on the tap.  This suggests 
that water and sewerage could usefully be considered one consumer 
decision”.  Moreover, if this is truly the case the efficiency losses that attend 
an increased volumetric charge on water to accommodate the cost of 
wastewater treatment might not be too severe. 
 
Supporting this view are recent calls for a ‘more holistic’ approach to water 
pricing to ensure that adequate signals are received by households about the 
benefits of water recycling (see, for instance, Khan 2007).  In essence, this 
argument contends that the real cost of water usage is deflated insomuch as 
  11the cost of disposing of wastewater (which is a subset of water use) does no 
adequately reflect the environmental degradation that attends ocean outfalls 
or in-stream wastewater pollution.  A Coasian solution would see the rights to 
environmental amenity in the receiving environment more clearly defined so 
that an optimal level of degradation could be established via trade (Crase 
2007).   The Pigovian alternative is to increase taxes on wastewater to 
encapsulate the social cost of wastewater disposal.  Both of these measures 
should a priori make the benefits of urban water recycling more apparent, 
although it also presumes that the outcomes of the Coasian trade or the 
Pigovian taxes ultimately resonate in the form of efficient price signals to 
consumers.  Thus, on the one hand a wastewater volumetric charge coupled 
to water usage has some appeal insomuch as it could provide a vehicle for 
signalling the broader costs of urban water use.  However, as we have 
already observed, this only holds insomuch as there is a relatively stable and 
homogenous relationship between households’ water consumption and their 
use of wastewater services.    
 
In sum, wastewater and water pricing in Australia is characterised by 
efficiency ‘compromises’.  In the case of water supplies the economic 
rationale for access charges is weak and there is a case for considering 
higher volumetric charges that reflect LRMC.  However, this needs to be 
considered against the increased revenue variability and risk borne by the 
water utility.   
 
  12In the context of wastewater pricing the nature of the service and the limits on 
metering technology make the deliver of an efficient outcome implausible – it 
is more a question of minimising efficiency losses.  Volumetric wastewater 
charges coupled to water use have some merit, which may explain why the 
Victorian ESC foreshadows that in future regulatory periods “sewerage 
charges for residential and non-residential customers … should include both 
fixed and volumetric components” (ESC 2005: 88).   However, there is also a 
danger that perverse cross-subsidies between water and wastewater services 
could arise from this approach.   
 
These ‘compromises’ are reflected in the variation in water and wastewater 
pricing regimes across Australian jurisdictions.  Even within single jurisdictions 
there is considerable variability, as witnessed by the current differences in 
wastewater pricing regimes in Victoria.   By and large, what is missing from 
this debate is an understanding of consumers’ preferences and tastes in this 
context.  This information would assist policy makers in choosing between 
‘sub-optimal’ alternatives which arguably are presently selected on the basis 
of bureaucratic preferences.  The following sections detail a methodology for 
eliciting such preferences before returning to the policy choices at hand.   
  
III Methodology and Rationale  
A way to examine the preferences of consumers for a range of water billing 
options involves conceptualising the bill itself as a ‘product’ that comprises of 
a number of attributes that, in combination, give the bill its form and utility 
(Kaul & Rao 1995).  Accordingly, a sample of consumers could be offered the 
  13choice between a bill that allows different levels of individual control (via 
smaller access charges) along with a range of other features, like the option 
of paying environmental premiums via the water account.   Participant’s 
repeated choices between these hypothetical billing systems ultimately reveal 
their preferences and the magnitude of the trade-offs that they make.  This 
technique is termed experimental choice analysis, and has been extensively 
used in environmental evaluation (see, for instance, Morrison, Blamey, 
Bennett & Louviere 1996; Morrison, Bennett & Blamey 1998), and more 
recently, in determining preferences for guaranteed service delivery in water 
utilities (Hensher, Shore and Train, 2005). 
 
Choice modelling draws upon the concept of rational economic actors 
pursuing utility maximising outcomes that forms the foundation of neo-
classical economics. It does however,  simultaneously recognise the 
constrained nature of the individual decision process as conceptualised by 
Simon (1959).  Notwithstanding the criticisms of stated preference 
techniques
2, a compelling advantage of this technique is that it affords the 
researcher the opportunity to gather ex ante data on consumer preferences, 
rather than relying on revealed preference data.  In the current context, 
changing a billing structure represents a non-trivial investment of financial and 
human resources that is arguably better informed with the type of ex-ante 
information furnished by a choice experiment such as this. 
 
                                                 
2Several areas of concern exist in the application of any stated preference technique.  Firstly, all stated preference techniques can 
be criticised due to the poor correlation between intent and behaviour.  For instance, Ajzen and Peterson (1988: 58) observe that 
‘…social psychological research has revealed poor relations between attitudes and overt action’.  Similarly, Diamond and 
Hausman (1994) found that there were large and significant differences between willingness to pay in stated preference 
experiments on one hand and actual payment on the other.  In addition, a number of biases associated with all stated preference 
techniques have been identified (see, for instance, Morrison et al. 1996). 
  14Choice modelling also allows for the incorporation of socio-economic and 
demographic data in the form of interaction terms within the models, enabling 
an expanded understanding of the likely characteristics of consumers 
favouring particular combinations of attributes of the billing system. In the 
present context, the bifurcation of the study area into two groups – those who 
presently pay only a fixed wastewater charge and those who pay a combined 
fixed and volumetric wastewater charge – may provide useful insights.   
 
IV  Experimental Procedure 
Appropriate experimental design is crucial to the success of a conjoint 
experiment like choice modelling (Hair et al. 1998: 99).  The aim in this phase 
is to identify those variables or attributes that affect consumer preferences, to 
assign realistic levels to these and to establish a suitable model for consumer 
preferences.  Since, in this case, the realistic choice context does not include 
a brand, the use of an unlabelled choice set was deemed appropriate.  This 
necessitates the estimation of generic parameters regardless of the number of 
choice alternatives (Hensher, Rose and Greene 2005: 151)
3.  In keeping with 
the nature of utilities, and following Hensher, Shore and Train (2005: 10) a ‘no 
choice’ option was not included.  This means that respondents were not given 
the alternative of ‘choosing neither’ in each choice set.  In the context of water 
bills this appears a reasonable approach given that all consumers must have 
water – as we noted earlier, consumers are obliged by law to connect to the 
water and wastewater network I most urban environments. The only realistic 
                                                 
3 Hensher et al. 2005 provide a comprehensive discussion of the theoretical and practical 
implications of the choice to employ an unlabelled or a labelled choice set. 
  15choice is between alternative billing systems, since consumers cannot choose 
not to have any bill.  An additive or main effects model was specified as these 
type of models generally account for 80-90% of the variation in preference in 
most cases, according to Hair et al. (1998: 408).  
 
(i) Identifying and specifying attributes and levels 
The identification and specification of attributes reflected the present research 
question along with other dimensions of interest from the funding body 
(Consumer Utilities Advocacy Centre).   Input was also sought from a range of 
industry ‘experts’ to ascertain those attributes that would be of most benefit in 
formulating tariff structures.  The attributes that emerged from this process 
were then discussed at length in interviews and focus groups, with the 
particular aim of ensuring that the attributes and their levels were able to be 
communicated in a meaningful way.  Following Lockwood and Carberry 
(1998), this phase was followed by survey pre-testing. In-depth semi-
structured focus interviews of around 30 to 40 minutes’ duration were 
conducted with volunteers in their homes.  Subsequently, focus groups 
comprising between 4 and 14 volunteers were then conducted to confirm the 
attributes and levels.  Importantly each of these components covered both 
small and large towns, and communities with differing water/wastewater bill 
structures.  The resulting attributes and levels emanating from this process 
are summarised in Table 1.  For convenience, the Table also includes the 
definition of other variables that ultimately proved significant in the statistical 
models.   
  16Table 1: Coding of attributes and variables 
 




over total water bill 
(CONTROL) 
The extent to which the household 
can reduce their bill by reducing 
consumption. 
 
Maximum, medium  1,0 
Method of payment 
to extend the 
network 
(DEVELOPERS) 
The extent to which the cost of 
extending the network is shifted to 
land developers.  
 
 Developers pay 






An unplanned disruption to a 
household’s water or wastewater 
service, which was not corrected 
within 5 hours, would result in a $25 










The option of paying a premium so 
that the water authority can 
undertake environmental offsets 
 
Yes, no  1,0 
Water saving tips 
and comparisons 
(TIPS) 
Bill to include comparisons with other 
households and advice on reducing 
water consumption. 
 
Yes, no  1,0 




Actual figures based on the average 
bill in each regimen. 





The respondent’s self-rating of 
his/her knowledge about water 
issues. 
 
Scale of 1-7 where 1 
= ‘no idea’ and 7 = 
‘completely informed’ 
1-7 
FIXED  Whether respondent was currently 
connected to the fixed or volumetric 
system 
Fixed, volumetric  1, 0 
PEOPLE  The number of people in the 
household. 
1-2, 3-4, 5-6, > 6  1,2,3,4 
 
There was general agreement across the interviews and focus groups that 
there were six attributes which represented the key aspects of a billing system 
on which they would base their choice: Namely, the amount of control they 
could exercise over the bill (CONTROL); whether their on-going bill funded 
expansion of infrastructure (DEVELOPERS); if a guaranteed service level was 
on offer (GSL); the possibility of purchasing green energy as part of the billing 
  17process (GREEN); if the bill contai9ned useful information to assist in saving 
water (TIPS), and; the quarterly cost (PRICE) .  Of particular interest in the 
present context is the ‘split’ between fixed and volumetric charging, and a 
review of the discussion in the focus groups revealed that many participants 
conceptualised this as ‘the extent of control’ an individual could exert over 
their bill.  As one participant observed: 
 
The service (access) charge represents most of my water bill.  I have no real 
control over the account. 
 
Another participant noted that: 
 
I am a low water user.  We don’t use much water and this is a choice we have 
made.  We replaced all our lawn because we thought that it was the right 
thing to do, but at the end of the day our bill is much the same.  I would like to 
think that I could drive my bill down by using less water. 
    
An information booklet was circulated with the choice experiment which 
detailed the level of ‘control’ that households would have by varying the 
weight of the fixed (access) charge.  The information booklet informed 
participants that any reduction in service charges would have to be 
accompanied by increases in the per unit price of water to ensure that it 
remained revenue neutral.  It also suggested that wastewater charges would 
be tied to the amount of water consumed.  Currently, half of the residents in 
the study area pay access charges which constitute about 70% of the average 
  18customer’s water bill, whilst in the other half of the study area access charges 
represent about 49% of the total water/wastewater bill.   
 
Two different revenue-neutral water charge scenarios were developed for 
each of the regions within the study area using data from North East Water.  
One involved a single access charge to water and wastewater equal to $50 
per quarter coupled with a single volumetric water charge of $1.36 whilst the 
other comprised a $25 access charge and a volumetric rate of $1.72 per 
kilolitre.  The former was referred to as a ‘medium control’ scenario whilst the 
latter was given the description as a ‘maximum control’ scenario. 
 
For the average household located in the region where a relatively high 
access charge currently applies, this represents a 112% and 170% increase 
in the volumetric rate for the respective scenarios, although the access charge 
would simultaneously fall by 55% and 77%.  In the region where a relatively 
low access charge currently applies, similar scenarios were developed.  
However, in this case the percentage increase in the volumetric rate
4 was less 
pronounced, corresponding to a 29% increase when the higher access charge 
is applied and 62% for the lower access charge.  The proportionate reduction 
in the access charges is also less for this region representing a 34% and 67% 
fall respectively. 
 
                                                 
4 In this region the volumetric rate for water use was about $0.64 per kilolitre. The wastewater 
volumetric charge is based on the assumption that 50% of all water returns to the sewer and attracts a 
treatment cost of $0.84 per kilolitres.  As we observed earlier this reduced to a defacto water price of 
$1.06 per kilolitre. 
  19Given the complexity of the topic and on the basis of the discussion in the 
focus groups the decision was taken to detail these scenarios by providing 
data on a range of indicative households.  In essence, this would show the 
impact of altering the weight of the access charge on an ‘average’ household 
(using 300 kilolitres per year) a ‘high-water-using’ household (440 kilolitres) 
and a low-water household (160 kilolitres).  An example of these data is 
provided in Table 2.  Since the sample comprised two main groups with 
slightly different billing structures two sets of surveys and information 
brochures were produced to make the survey reflective of the respondent’s 
current billing arrangements.  The PRICE attribute remained common across 
both samples insomuch as the variations to the average water bill in each 
region was used to define the attribute levels (see, Table 1).   
 
Table 2:  Water Account ‘Control’ Scenarios – Version 2 
Household Water 









Low Water Use 
Household: 
















High Water Use 
Household: 








The other attributes included in the choice experiment included the different 
approaches to funding network extensions, the existence of a Guaranteed 
Service Level (GSL) and whether there was an option to pay a premium that 
would enable the water utility to undertake environmental offsets.  In addition, 
  20the qualitative data collected earlier supported the inclusion of water saving 
tips as a relevant attribute of a water account.  Finally, the cost (price) was 
described as the change in cost per quarter for the average household, 
although, as we have already observed respondents were made aware of the 
impact of their choice on low-water and high-water using households. 
 
The focus group discussions had shown the potential for payment vehicle 
bias, with numerous participants expressing their objection to paying anything 
extra to the water utility.  With this in mind, each choice set was carefully 
constructed and the price increase was justified in terms of the minimum costs 
borne by the water utility to bring forth the features of the tariff.  For example, 
the GSL was described as comprising a $25 rebate to customers that suffered 
an unplanned service disruption of more than 5 hours.  Moreover, the overall 
cost of this was estimated as being about 10 cents per household and this 
information was included. 
 
The survey was pre-tested by 30 volunteers to ascertain whether the choice 
sets were communicable and whether the payment vehicle bias was likely to 
be problematic.  Most respondents indicated that the choice tasks had been 
challenging but manageable if kept to a modest number.  None of those who 
participated in the pilot survey expressed concern about the changes in tariffs 
being unrealistic or unreasonable.  
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(ii) Design of the choice sets 
A main effects fractional factorial design was generated using SPSS Conjoint 
which yielded 16 choice options.  A fold-over design was then used to 
generate alternative choice options which were paired to provide the choice 
sets.  These choice sets were put to respondents in terms of which option 
they would prefer as a billing structure for an average household in North East 
Victoria.  This approach, where the respondent ‘votes’ for an option for people 
in North East Victoria, varies from applications of experimental choice 
analysis where individuals are asked which product they would purchase, or 
which travel option they would choose.  In effect, respondents are asked to 
choose as citizens, rather than as consumers per se although this is not 
inconsistent with other applications of similar techniques (see, Blamey, 
Common and Quiggin 1995).   
 
An example of a choice set appears below in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Example of a choice set for a water bill 
 
Choice 1 (one tick in bottom box): 
 Features  Option 1   Option 2 
Household control over 
total water bill  Maximum  Medium 
Paying for extending the 
network 
Included in water 
charges 
Developers pay  
more 
Guaranteed service level  Yes  No 
Optional environmental 
premium  No  Yes 
Water-saving tips and 
comparisons  No  Yes 
Cost per quarter for 
average household 
(75kl) 
$159  $164 
Tick one option  
in this table   Î 
    
 
 
Each respondent was faced with four separate choice sets, given concern 
about the extent of cognitive burden visited on respondentsTP
5
PT. Blamey et. al 
(1997) suggest that reducing the number of choice sets may assist in this 
regard, as well as the inclusion of attitudinal questions and ‘debriefing’ 
questions since these may then allow individuals to express their views more 
freely.   
                                                 
TP
5
PT Recent empirical work by Hensher , for example, maintains that it is not the number of choices and attributes per se 
that make an experiment burdensome, but rather the selection of inappropriate attributes, levels and alternatives that 
complicates the respondent’s decision task.  Brazell and Louviere  subjected respondents to up to 96 choice 
situations without any appreciative ‘cognitive burden’ being detected. 
  
(iii) Administration of the survey 
The sample was a stratified random sample of 1686 water customers serviced 
by North East Water.  More specifically, in September 2006, a total of 800 
surveys were distributed to customers on the fixed system, and 886 to those 
volumetric. Each potential participant was sent a survey, information booklet, 
information sheet and a stamped self-addressed envelope in which to return 
the survey.  A thankyou and reminder letter was posted after 10 days.  
Relatively few minor changes were effected as a result of this process.  Each 
survey was accompanied by an information booklet that calibrated attributes 
against the customer’s current billing system, to enable meaningful 
interpretation of the status quo.  
 
(iv) Overview of survey respondents  
After two weeks had elapsed 338 of the total 1686 surveys were returned, 
representing a response rate of approximately 20%. Some respondents (12) 
failed to complete any of the choice sets, and so these surveys were 
discarded from the data set for estimating the models. Details of the ’average’ 
respondent are summarised in Table 4.   
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Table 4:  Characteristics of average survey respondent 
Age (years) 








about water use 
(0-7) 
48.4  2.4 $46052.29 $98.75 4.5
 
V  Estimation of Choice Models 
In the first instance, basic multinomial logit models were computed using 
Equation 1. A specialised computer program, LIMDEP, designed to analyse 
models employing limited dependent variables, was used to conduct the 
















B GSL + βB4
BGreen + βB5
BTips + βB6
BPrice         [1]                            
 
Parameter estimates were generic, and since a non-labelled design was 
employed, a single constant was employed across the model.  The results of 
the model estimation process pertinent to the CONTROL attribute are 
contained in Table 5.  In addition, alternative functional forms for each of the 
attributes were trialled but did not improve the performance of the models.  
For the sake of clarity, only those attributes and other variables that were 
significant are included.    26
      
Table 5: Choice Models 
 












CONTROL  0.3831*** 
(6.175) 
 
































0.15029  0.15089 
 
Adjusted Rho 2 (ρP
2
Padj) 
0.14570  0.14563 
 
Observations  1304  1304 
 
Chi-Square  1669.8854  1664.2169 
 
t- ratios in parentheses 
***Significant at the 1% level 
**Significant at the 5% level 
*Significant at the 10% level 
 
 
The resulting linear model is referred to as Model 1.  The coefficients for the 
six attributes in this model are significant at the 1% level or better and have   27
signs which meet a priori expectations.  More specifically, all attributes are 
positively signed with the exception of PRICE which attracts a negative sign 
indicating that respondents were less likely to choose an option with a higher 
price.   
 
The adjusted Rho 2 indicates adequate explanatory power.  Rho 2 values of 
between 0.2 and 0.4 are usually regarded as a good fit of the data in choice 
analysis (see, for example Hensher & Johnson 1981).  However, Wooldridge 
(2000: 563) notes that  "goodness-of-fit is not usually as important as 
statistical and economical significance of the explanatory variables".  Model 
significance was estimated using an approach employed by Lockwood and 
Carberry (1998: 6-7) and Morrison (2000: 23). In this instance the chi-square 
statistic exceeds the critical value of 16.8119TP
6
PT and the null hypothesis that the 
model is insignificant is rejected.  That is, the chi-square is supports the view 
that the model is statistically significant. 
   
Choice modelling allows for socio-economic and demographic variables to be 
included in the models, however since these variables do not differ across the 
choice sets, they cannot be used to predict the option chosen (Blamey, 
Gordon & Chapman 1999: 350).  They can, however, be used to explain 
some of the preference heterogeneity through interaction with attributes in the 
choice sets. The aim in doing so is to facilitate increased understanding of the 
behavioural effect of each attribute.  Here we report only those interactions 
that relate to the CONTROL attribute and this is referred to as Model 2.  
                                                 
7 The critical value used here was χP
2 
Pα=0.01.  The degrees of freedom are equal to the 
number of restrictions on the model.  Tellingly, Model 2 shows two important trends which are dealt with in the 
following section.   
 
The choice modelling technique also allows for the calculation of implicit 
prices or marginal rates of substitution that put a dollar value on the trade-offs 
individuals make between attributes of a billing regime.  For example, we can 
estimate how much an individual is, on average, willing to pay to have 
increased control over their bill.  Confidence intervals for implicit price 
estimates can be calculated using a technique attributed to Krinsky and Robb 
(1986) using the coefficients generated by Model 1.  Results for implicit prices 
and related confidence intervals are reported in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Estimated Marginal Rates of Substitution for Attributes 
(Based on Model 1) 
95% confidence interval 
Attribute Mean 
Lower bound  Upper bound 
CONTROL  $7.06  $4.68  $10.08 
DEVELOPERS $8.61  $6.06  $11.84 
TIPS  $5.27 $2.97 $8.06 
GREEN  $4.81 $2.45 $7.58 
GSL  $5.44 $2.99 $8.25 
 
Marginal rates of substitution give an estimate of the trade-offs between the 
PRICE attribute, and another attribute of interest.  The result is that these 
calculations reveal the magnitude of respondents’ willingness to pay to have 
the various aspects of a billing regime included.  
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VI  Discussion and Interpretation of Findings 
Scrutiny of these models and implicit price estimates reveals some important 
insight into the preferences of North East Water customers in relation to 
various components of a hypothetical billing structure.  Attributes of PRICE, 
DEVELOPERS, CONTROL, TIPS, GSL and GREEN were important 
determinants of the level of utility associated with a particular billing structure, 
although in the present context the CONTROL attribute has important 
implications. 
 
Recall that the CONTROL attribute represents the extent to which the 
household could amend their water account by adjusting water use.  The data 
suggest that the CONTROL attribute is central to the choice decision and 
invokes a mean WTP estimate of $ 7.06 per quarter.  Put differently, not only 
do households appear to favour a tariff structure that affords them greater 
choice, they are willing to pay to see this structure implemented. 
 
Prima facie it might be expected that households using less water, on 
average, would opt for this attribute, or at least more so than those with 
average or above average consumption patterns.  To test this hypothesis data 
on the participants’ estimate of their most recent water account was 
introduced as an interaction term but failed to be statistically significant.  
Similarly, household size was introduced into the choice models but, again, 
proved to be insignificant.  This lends some support to the view that all 
households would prefer that access charges constituted a smaller proportion 
  29of their water charges, including those whose accounts would seem likely to 
increase as a result. 
 
Additional interaction variables were also trialled in the choice models to 
further investigate the choice context (see, model 2).  A variable which 
represented the respondents’ assessment of their own knowledge (RATE) 
proved significant when interacted with CONTROL.  Moreover, the positive 
sign that attends this term (CONTROL*RATE) suggests that those who rated 
their knowledge of water use higher were more inclined to choose an option 
that embodied maximum household control.  Presumably, this reflects the 
additional salience of the CONTROL variable to those households with a 
greater understanding of their own water-use behaviour. 
 
In addition, a dummy variable that represents the current wastewater tariff 
structure was interacted and proved significant.  In this instance, the variable 
(FIXED) was coded ‘1’ for that portion of the sample that presently pay only a 
fixed access wastewater tariff and ‘0’ for those currently faced with a 
composite volumetric/fixed tariff.  Tellingly, the sign for this interaction term 
(CONTROL*FIXED) was positive.  This suggests that those residents who 
presently have a fixed wastewater tariff were significantly more predisposed to 
selecting an option with maximum control than others.  Arguably, this is 
explained by the status quo of these residents, who currently have less 
influence over their total water account than those with a tariff that includes a 
volumetric wastewater component. 
 
  30Other demographic and socio-economic variables were trialled as interaction 
variables but were not statistically significant. One explanation for this could 
reside in the nature of the choice experiment and the context in which the 
choice was made.  More specifically, the choice attributes were designed 
around the ‘average household’ and respondents were asked to choose on 
behalf of that household.  Notwithstanding that respondents were given 
sufficient information to deduce the likely impact of that choice on their own 
household, this setting encourages respondents to view the choice problem 
more as ‘citizens’ than as ‘consumers’. If respondents made choices strictly 
as ‘price conscious consumers’ we would reasonably expect strategic 
behaviour, particularly from those who were heavy water users.  The fact that 
variables like income, age and the cost of the previous water bill were not 
significant lends some support to the view that respondents considered the 
problem from a ‘citizen’s’ perspective.  
 
Regardless of the mode by which respondents made a choice, the data 
provide unequivocal evidence that urban water customers in North-East 
Victoria would prefer tariff structures that embody a lower access charge and 
a higher volumetric charge.  In addition, the data indicate that this preference 
is strongest within those communities that presently face fixed wastewater 
tariffs.  On the basis of this information it could be argued that consumers see 
merit in moving towards a volumetric wastewater charge, since this provides a 
defacto mechanism for increasing household control/choice.   
 
  31The fact that the interaction term that encapsulated the households rating of 
their water knowledge proved significant when interacted with a number of 
attributes in the models should not be overlooked from a policy perspective.  
These results suggest that any move towards greater volumetric tariffs and 
smaller access charges is likely to be more willingly received by customers if 
they are simultaneously given the capacity to enhance their water knowledge.   
 
VII  Concluding Remarks 
The current structure of water and wastewater tariffs embody many 
inconsistencies and trade-offs.  We have argued that the present emphasis on 
access or fixed charges is inconsistent with economic theory and provides 
little incentive for households to adopt strategies that limit their use of water.  
Arguably, it might come as no surprise that water utilities are forced to revert 
to mandated water restrictions, in part, because of the inability of tariff 
structures to send appropriate behavioural signals to water consumers. 
Nevertheless, access charges do provide revenue stability for water utilities 
and it is this argument that appears to have held sway with regulators.   
 
A confounding problem is the manner in which wastewater tariffs are 
structured.  Volumetric tariffs in this context provide increased incentives to 
reduce water use, although they also embody inefficiencies insomuch as they 
must be assumed on the basis of water consumption because of the lack of 
metering technology.  
 
  32In the absence of any compelling theoretical arguments to resolve these 
matters the preferences of consumers were investigated using a choice 
modelling technique.  The results from the choice models show a clear 
preference from consumers to switch to higher volumetric charges and lower 
access charges.  These preferences were strongest for respondents who 
reside in communities that presently face a fixed wastewater tariff and 
amongst those who rated their own knowledge of water use highly.  
Accordingly, these data provide support for policies that amend tariffs in line 
with consumer preferences. 
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